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In the Supreme C.ou1·t of the State of Utah
PRTTDENTIAL FEDT1JRAL SA VIN GS
& LOAN ASSOCIA'l'ION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
THE ST. PAUL INSURANCE
COMP ANLE}S,
Def end.ant and Apprllant

Case No.
10765

and
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
J l\TSUHANCE AND '!'RUST
ccnrPANY
Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association seeks a declaratory judgment against
appellant only determining which of the two defendant
insurance companies is liable to plaintiff on the two
separate policies issued by defendants to plaintiff for
its alleged loss. On motion of appellant, respondent First
American Title Insurance & Trust Company was joined
as a defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN LO-WER COrlRT
On July 21, 1966, the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Honorable A. H. Ellett presiding, entered Findings of Fact and Summary Judgment declaring appellant
liable to plaintiff upon its policy of insurance and dismissing respondent First American Title Insurance &
Trust Company for failure to state a claim against it. On
October 19, 1966, the same Court denied appellant's .Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Summary .Judgment,
and appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the District Court's Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal of July 21,
1966, in favor of both respondents and remand of the
case to the District Court for trial, or in the alternative,
reversal of the Judgment dismissing respondent First
American and remand with instructions to. dismiss respondent First American without prejudicP.
STATEMENT OF F Acrrs
Respondents filed Motions for Sununary Judgment
based only upon the Complaint and Answers herein
(R-27, R-30). Plainiff served appellant with an Affidavit supporting its Motion on July U, 19GG at 3 :15 p.rn.
On hearing of the Motions on July lR, 19GG, two workinp:

3
days after serv1ce of the affidavit, appellant's counsel
objected to the Court's considering the Affidavit (R-93,
R-100 and Rtakd appellant had additional facts to
presPnt (R-93, R-100). The Court permitted appellant to
make an offer of proof thereon. This Statement of Fact
is then based partially upon that offer, but only as
indicated.
Delmer D. Rowley had for many years been a loan
officPr of plan tiff building and loan association (R-1).
Ther0 had been a long history of dealings between plaintiff, Ro,wley & Security T'itle Company. Security Title
knew plaintiff was in the first mortgage business (R-93,
97). Rowley owned, hut had individually sold real propaty to one Parker and wife on a contract in 1962 (R-38).
Rowley had a 19Gl mortgage of about $1±,300 on the
property with First Federal Savings & Loan Association
(R-38). Respondent's counsel offered to prove Rowley
also had a second mortgage with Buffo Realty, recorded
February 10, 1961 (R-94). In December, 1962, the
Parkers applied to plaintiff, through Rowley, for a mortgage loan of $16,300 to pay off Ro,wley's contract (R-1).
Security Title Company, agents for respondent First
American, on December 26, 1962, issued a preliminary
title report showing the First Federal mortgage, but
not the Buffo Realty mortgage, and advising a $16,300
title policy would be issued to plaintiff on vesting
of plaintiff's interest for a $36.25 premium (R-38).
Security Title knew Parker and Rowley were refinancing
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Parker's contract by the anticipated mortgage to plaintiff when it issued the preliminary report (R-97). Plaintiff, through Rowley, then lent the Parkers $16,300
secured by a trust deed on the property and Rowley,
as plaintiff's loan officer, disbursed $14,600 to himself
to pay off Parker's contract and the balance to plaintiff
for loan costs (R-2). Plaintiff's trnst deed was dated
December 26, 1962. Rowley didn't pay off f~ither of the
prior mortgages but continued to pay the monthly payments on them (R-2).
Plaintiff's counsel offered to prove that when Rowley st>nt thP Parker trust deed to Security to be recorded,
he sent written instructions saying in substance "don't
issue the title policy until the First Federal mortgage
is rPleased" (R-98). Respondents told the trial court
they would not stipulate as to Rowley's instructions to
Security Title Company (R-97), so the Court was aware
of that factual dispute. In any event, it is obviously
normal procedure for title companies not to issue title
policies to mo.rt gage companies until defects shown in the
preliminary report and which ought to be cured in closing
the mortgage are in fact cured, so the title policy, when
issued, will show in subsPquent portfolio examination:,;
a valid first mortgage without material exceptions.
Security recorded the Parker trust deed on January
22, 1963. Plaintiff alleges, but hasnt proven, that in
August, 1963, Security delivered respondent First Ameri-

~)

ean's title policy to plaintff insuring the trust deed as
a first lien, even though thE' First Federal mortgage had
not be<'n paid off ( R--1-). Appellant offered to prove
that this occurred hecausp Rowley paid off the Buffo
second mortgage>, Security saw the release, mistook it
for the rf'leas0 of the First FedPral mortgage and sent
the title policy to plaintiff (R-9-1-, 95), and that had the
First FPderal mortgage been shown on the title policy,
the dE'falcation would haw tlwn hec>n discovered and
Ho1dey could have then respondPd to the defalcation,
lmt sine(~ the polic>• was regnlar on its face, it was placed
in the loan folder, thPreby creating the impression to
~mbseqnent auditors and bank E'XaminE'rs that plaintiff
had a good first trust dePd (R-101).
ln .l\larch, 19o5, plaintiff discovered other embezzlements by Rowley and thereby found its Parker trust
deed was not a first lien (R-35), and Rowley quit paying
the First Federal payments. By letter of April 14, 1965,
plaintiff made formal demand upon Security Title to
forthwith clear the title to the Parker property of the
First Federal lien and threatening legal action (R-77).
On June 17, 19G5, Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss,
then as attorneys for SPcurity Title, but now representing plaintiff, wrote to appellant's counsel with copy to
plaintiff and Security rritle recommending that Security
deny liability to plaintiff on its title policy, in effect
~aying

appellant is liable therefor (R-78,79).
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Appellant's Savings, Building & Loan Association
Blanket Bond with Extended Coverages (R-104) was
in force by which appellant, among many other things,
indemnified plaintiff "against any loss by reason of an)r
dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any employee ...
including lo.ss of property" (R~l04). The bond indemnifies plaintiff against a myriad of other items such as
claims expense, property damage during robbery or related crimes, payments to employees injured during rohbery, etc., lost instruments, loss of customer's property
through robbery, etc., loss of pro·1wrty in transit, property lost by fraud of any persons, loss through guaranteeing signatures, loss through counterfeit money, safr
deposit liability, lost property, loss through forged or
altered instruments, expenses o.f employees defending
suits, liability for false arrest, etc. The Bond provides:
''If the Insured holds other valid or collectible
indemnity against any loss, covered herennder,
the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder only for
such amount of such loss as is excess of the
amount o.f such other indemnity, not exceeding th!:'
amount of coverage hereunder.''

On June 21, 1965, four days after its counsel recommended liability be denied to plaintiff, Security Title paid
all of the monthly payments then owing on the First
Federal mortgage, and has paid all subsequent monthly
payments, and has in its possession a payment book for
paying the monthy payments (R-7:3, 74).
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The rn•xt month, Security Title's counsel, now
appearing for plaintiff, filed complaint for declaratory
judgment, naming only appellant as defendant, but not
S<'curity Title or its principal, First American.
Appellant answPred (R-5) and raised issues o.f fact,
among other things, by denying plaintiff suffered a loss,
denying what plaintiff alleged appellant's bond provided,
denying plaintiff made no reliance on the title policy
prior to closing the loan and alleging that loans were
always closed prior to the issuance of title insurance.
Appellant moved the court to join First American as a
defendant on grounds that plaintiff had a claim against
First American, that First American had an interest
in tht> action and \Vould be affected hy the declaratory
judgment and that First American ought to be joined
if complett> relief is to be a:c-corded the parties (R-6, 7).
On :N ovemher 29, 19G5, the District Court ordered
First Auwric-an Title Insurance joined as a party defendant.
Counsel for S0curity Title and plaintiff so couched
the c-omplaint that defendant First American, Security
Title's pincipal, ·could simply admit, and in fact did
admit, all allegations and c-onclusions of the complaint,
then•hy making it appear that plaintiff agreed with defr•ndant :F'irst American and did not claim against it.
Beeanse plaintiff might never cause Summons to· be
:-:<•nec1 upon <lPfondant First American, appellant did

B

so, reqmrmg it to state fully jts position with regard
to both the complaint and appellant's answer (R-10, 11).
First American answered, admitting the Complaint, and
as to appellant's answer, denying that its title policy
was "other indemnity" within the exclusions of appellant's policy, and alleging the First Federal mortgage
was not insured by its policy because it prnvided in
paragraph 3(d):
"This policy does not insure against loss or
damage by reason of tlw following:
( d)
... Liens ... against thP title as insured
or other matters ( 1) created, suffered, assumed
or agreed to by tlw insured claiming loss or damage; or (2) known to the insured claimant at thr
date such insured Claimant acquired an estate or
interest insured by this policy and not known to
the Company or not shown by tlw public records:
or ( 3) resulting in no loss to the insured claimant." (R-22, 23).
The transcript of hearing of respondents Motions
for Smnmary Judgment indicates the Court grante<l
respondents' Motions on the sole ground that the titl<'
policy is not other indemnity within the meaning of
appellant's polfry. The Court, in response to appellant's
counsel's reference to the issue of ''other indPnmity,''
said ( R-98) :

"THE COURT: vVell, I am safo;fied in my

°''"n mind. I am willing to take my risk on that.
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So I will hold that the title policy is not other
indemnity within the meaning of St. Paul's policy
and that - I should grant plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and deny-."
On hearing, the Court specifically stated it was not
passing upon any claim that plaintiff or appellant might
have against defendant First American and declined to
grant First American's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court said to appellant's counsel:
1

"THE COURT: And shouldn't you fall heir
to anything you ·can collect from the title company MR. PALMER: Sure.
THE COURT: - if you pay off1 (R-95)
4* *
THE COURT: I don't think it (appellant's
offer of proof) matters a bit. I don't think the
title company is involved in this at all, that there
is no other indemnity for dishonest employees, and
St. Paul is liable for that. N o·w I'm not sure but
vvhat St. Paul may not have some right over
against this (title) company. I doubt it They
m'.ght have and T don't pass on that now." (R- 97).
The Court, speaking to First American's counsel,
~aid

(R-98):
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"THE COURT: \¥hat is your motion, that
you have no liability over to Prudential or to
St. Paul~
MR. DRAPER: To Prudential. I have no
liability.
THE COURT: To Prudential 1

MR.

DRAPJ~R:

Well, that isn't quite right.

THE COUR:T : You may have

MR. DRAPER: That's true.
THE COURT: I had better deny your motion
because there is some fuss between you two (defendants) that I 'rn not sure hut what it may be
good.
MR. DRAPER: Prudential has not sued First
American. The only reason First American is in
is that the court allowed St. Paul to bring them in
as another defendant to determine in a declaratory manner which of these two policies was liable
to Prudential. We say the St. Paul policy is the
one they must THE COURT: I am ready to dismiss you
- but that is no·t what you 're asking me to do
with this motion, is it?
MR. DRAPER: Well, [ th ink you have
accomplished the same thing.
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THE COURT: Just ruling for him~ (Meaning plaintiff)

MR DRAPER: Ruling for him.
THI1J COURT: \Vill you draw the orded"
The minute entry entered July 18, HJ6G (R-4c5),
reflects: "the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion and denies
Dt>fendant's ~lotion."
On July 21, 19GG, the District Court entered Findings
of Fact and Smrnnary Judgment (R-58 - 62), virtually
reciting tht> complaint and finding plaintiff suffered a
loss, declaring that First American's title policy does not
constitute "othc->r insurance" within the exclusions of
apvellant's policy, granting plaintiff's l\lotion for Summary Jndgnwnt, and dismissing defendant First Ameriean "as no claim has bt>Pn statPd against it upon whi{'h
rdief ean he granted."
On August 1, 1966, appellant moved to amend (R-63 72), filing affidavits dPaling wiht the issues of whether
plaintiff, in fact, clainwd against St>curity Title and respondtint First American and whether plaintiff had suff<>recl a loss. An affidavit supporting appellant's offer
of llroof was not fih,d lwcause the Court indicated it
was immatc->rial and the decision was made on the foregoing grnnnds. ']'he motion again objected to the
t;1Mlim'ss of plaintiff's affidavit, and pointed out the
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insufficiency of the admissions in the answer to prove all
the factual allegatons of the complaint. On hearing of
that Motion on October 18, 1966, plaintiff, for the first
time, offered a copy o.f appellant's bond in evidence.
It was admitted (R-81, 104) and appellant's Motion
to Amend was denied (R-82). Appellant appeals from
the Summary Judgment on July 21, 1966.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF HAS SUSTAINED A LOSS AND THE EVIDENCE SHOWS PLAINTIFF
HAS SUSTAINED NO LOSS.

Not even in plaintiff's affidavit is thE>re evidence
to show that the mortgage of First Federal Savings has
not been paid. That was the first question inquired about
by the Court on hearing of the Motions for Summary
Judgment. The record, page 93, reflects :

up?

"THE COURT: ls that mortgage being paid

MR. PUGSLEY: The mortgage is not delinquent. (argument)''
Plaintiff's counsel simply made that factual admission by way of argument, but it is not wrifiE'd Pvidencc
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on which summary judgment can be based. Respondent's
Affidavit of G0rald R. Christensen, Executive Vice-President of First Federal Savings (R-73, 74) shows that
Security Title, defendant First American's agent, has
paid all of the monthly payments due upon the mortgage
and has th"' payment book in its possession. So long as
someone other than plaintiff pays the ~~irst Federal mortgage, plaintiff isn't hurt at all by its existence, or at
lPast plaintiff's evidence fails to show any damage or loss.
Appellant, appealing from Summary Judgment, is
Pntitled to all reasonahlE' inferences from the facts on
this appeal. The reasonable infE>rences arising from
the fact that First Am0rican 's agent, Security 'tiitle, is
paying tlw first mortgage are: (l) plaintiff does claim
against First American and Security Title, (2) they
rPeognir,e tlwir liability to plaintiff upon the title policy,
and ( 3) by the presurnpti on of the continuance of existing
eonditions (lfo11sen v. Hansen, 110 Ut. 222, 171 P. 2d 392),
they will pay or have agreed to pay the First Federal
mortgage in full. It is furtlwr obvious that Security Title
Company's former counsel, now appearing for plaintiff,
sPeks b>' this aetion to pass on to app0llant the liability of
First American and Security Title to plaintiff. No wonder plaintiff has not sued First American, as First
American's counsel represented to the court on the :Motion for Summary Judgment (R-99). No wonder plaintiff's counsel's memorandum conelndes plaintiff thinks
appdlunt, not First American, is liable (R-5G).
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Without evidence that the First Federal mortgage
has not been paid, with plaintiff's counsel's admission
that the mortgage is not delinquent, or with the evidence
that Security Title Company is paying the current
monthly payments on the First Federal mortgage and
the resulting inference that it recognizes its liability to
pay the whole mortgage, plaintiff fails to meet its burden
of proo.f that it sustained any loss covered by appellant's
policy.
Therefore, the summary judgn1ent should be n•versed and the case remanded for trial.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT FIRST AMERICAN SPECIFICALLY INSURED PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE PARTICULAR LOSS
COMPLAINED OF, WHEREAS APPELLANT'S POLICY IS
GENERAL, AND THE LOSS SHOULD BE BORNE BY THE
SPECIFIC INSURER.

The precise fact of which plaintiff complains is that
plaintiff does not have a first lien upon the Parker
property. The Complaint in paragraph 5 says (R-2):
'·As a result ... the mortgage which the plaintiff company has upon the property ... is not a
first lien upon the property and is secondary in
right and priority.... ''
In paragraph 7, plaintiff complains:

15
"
(Rowley) thereby deprived the plaintiff
of the first mo1igage lien as a result of the execution of tlw mortgage by the Parker'S to plaintiff.''
That plaintiff does not have the loan proceeds which
Rowley appropriated does not cause plaintiff loss, for
plaintiff loaned the funds to the Parkers for payment
to Rowley and it was never intended that plaintiff have
them. That the proceeds of the loan were paid to Rowley,
of itself, does not cause plaintiff loss, for Parker's contract of purchase ran to Rowley and to pay off Rowley
and receive a deed to the property, thf' Parkers had to
pay Rowley in full the contract balance due Rowley.
Rowley failed to obtain a release o.f the First Federal
mortgage and that breached his contract with Parker
to deliver clear title to the property upon payment in
full. It was Rowley's failure to obtain a release of the
First Fed(~ral mortgage, but not his rf'ceipt of the funds
from plaintiff or Parker in the first instance, that
breached his obligation to Parker under the sales contract and his obligation, as one of plaintiff's loan officers
to pla«'e plaintiff's lif'n in first priort~'·
Suppose Rowley had endorsed plantiff's check, deliwred it to First Fedf'ral 's messenger to pay the First
Federal mortgage, but the messenger had forged the
check and k(~pt the proceeds and First Americon issued
the title policy without obtaining releasf' of First Federal's mortgage. Then R.owley would have violated no
duty to plaintiff and clearly respondent First American
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would be liable on its title policy. Suppo:se either First
Federal's messenger or Rowley kept the loan proce>ed:,.;
and forged a release on First Federal's mortgage; tlw
title company would still be bound.
Rowley could have delive>red the proceeds of the loan
to himself and paid them to First Federal ·without violation of any duty to plaintiff. It follows that the cause
of plaintiff's alleged loss is the failurl' to obtain release
of the First Federal mortgage. That caused plaintiff's
trust deed to be in second priority. Plaintiff specifically
complains that its trust deed is not in first priority.
Thus the precise fact which plaintiff i:mys caused its
loss is also the precise fact against which respondent
First American, for the policy pn•mium had and received,
insured plaintiff, for First American specifically insured

this trust deed of plaintiff's on this transadion to be a
valid first lien and insured against nothing elsP.
It is clear that it is the titlP policy which specifically

insures plaintiff against the exact cause of plantiff 's loss
and no.t appellant's "Savings, Building and Loan Association Blanket Bond with Extended CoveragPs" (R-104)
which insures agaim;t many more things than employee's
fidelity.
6 Appleman, Insurance La\v and PractieP, ~ 3912,

provides:
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p. 297. "A blanlu~t, compound or floater
poliey is written upon a risk as a whol~, embracing
whatever articles or items are included therein,
often ehang"ing in its nature; in contravention
thereto, a spP.cific policy is one which allocates the
amount of the risk in stated values upon the several items embraced in the coverage. In making
an apportionment between blanket and specific
policies, it is necessary that a rule be adopted
that will give the insured complete indemnity
for his loss. A blanket or floating policy is only
intended to s1tpplement specific insurance, and it
cannot become operative itniil the specific insiira ncP has bePn P.rhansted.
* * *
p. 300. "Sina such blankPt policies are genPrall,11 regardPd, and u.mally provide, that they
operate as e.r;cess insitrance only over and above
specific insHrance, they are not considered as
other insurance so as to provide a policy defense
to the spPcific in.rnrer, n.or for the purpose of
prorating the lo<;s." (Emphasis a<ldf'd)
R< StlondPnt First American's policy is specific, for it
alloeates the amount of risk in stated values, that is,
$16,300, the amount of plaintiff's trust deed, and is only
upon the one item, that is, the validity and priority of
plaintiff's trust deed. Appellant's bond is by its caption
a hlankPt bond and embraces varying risks on various
artieles of undefined property, possible liabilies and
types of possible lossPS.
1

Since th<' JH't'c:se fact of which plaintiff eomplains
was imrnn d hy rPspondont First Anwrican, since the
1
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cause of plaintiff's alleged loss was the failure to obtain
release of the First Federal mortgage and First American insured against that and since First American's policy is specific, whereas appellant's bond is general, the
loss, if any, should be borne by First American. Therefore the Summary Judgment against appellant and the
order dismissing respondent First American should be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
POINT III.
IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED WHETHER PLAINTIFF
SUSTAINED A LOSS WITHIN
WITHOUT

DETERMINING

APPELLANT'S POLICY

WHETHER

RESPONDENT

FIRST AMERICAN IS LIABLE ON ITS POLICY; THE
COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING WHETHER RESPONDENT FIRST AMERICAN IS LIABLE AND IN FINDING PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED A LOSS WITHIN APPELLANT'S POLICY.

On hearing on the

~fotion

for Summary Judgment,

the Court said ( R-97) :
'"THE COURT: I don't think it (plaintiff's
offer o.f proof as to First American's liability)
matters a bit. I don't think that the~ title company
is involved in this at all, that there is no other
indemnity for dishonest employees, and St. Paul
is liable for that. I'm not sure but what St. Paul
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may not have some right over against this (title)
company. I doubt it. They might have, and I
don't pass on that now."
If respondent First American is liable and collectible
npon its policy, plaintiff will have suffered no loss as
to appellant's policy. The District Court expressly refused to find whether First American is liable and collectiblP on the title policy.
Rowley paid off the Buffo Realty second mortgage
which the title company missed in both the preliminary
report and title policy, but plaintiff asserts no claim
therefor (R-94). Just as no claim is asserted for the
Buffo mortgage, if Rowley, or any third person, some
months afh'r closing of the Parkt>r loan, had paid off
the First Federal mortgage, plaintiff would have no
claim against appe>llant for Rowley's failure to pay it
earlier. Likewise, if some months after the closing, plaintiff accepted, not payment for the F'irst Federal mortgagt>, but a dPmand note, fully collectihe, from a third
person promising to pay the First Federal mortgage,
plaintiff would have no claim against appellant, for no
loss would he sustained. So here, plaintiff has in its
hands not a note, but a title insurance policy from re:-ipondent First American insuring plaintiff against loss
if plaintiff's trust dt>ed is not a first lien on the
Parker property. That i::i an insurance contract for which
plaintiff rmid the required premium. Plaintiff's trust
<levd is not a first lien on the Parker propNty and the
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msurance contmct is breached. Absent a finding, as a
matter of fact, that First American is not liable or is
uncollectible upon its title policy, it cannot be said as a
matter of fact that plaintiff has suffered a loss as to
appellant's blanket bond.
Plaintiff alleged both policies in this action for
declaratory jugment and tendered to th«:> Court

th(~

issue

of which defendant is liibale. Appellant's Answ«:>r and
the District Court's Order joining First American as a
party defendant further highlighted that issue as the
issue for determination in the case. The District Court,
on Motions for Summary Judgment, then erroneously
refused to consider the liability of defendant First American, even though the parties tendered that issue.
Therefore, the District Court erred in refusing to
find as a matter of fact whether respondent First American is liable and is collectibe upon its title policy, and
erred in finding that plaintiff suffered a loss as to
appellant's policy. The Summary Judgment should be
reversed and the case remanded to the District Court with
instructions to make findings upon the question of First
American's liability so it can be determined, as a matter
of fact, whether plaintiff had a loss as to appellant's
policy.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT RESPONDENT'S TITLE POLICY IS NOT
APPELLANT'S BLANKET BOND.

Appellant's blanket bond (R-104) provides:
"If the Insured holds other valid or collectible
indemnity against any loss, covered hereunder,
the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder only for
such amount of such loss as is excess of the
amount of such other indemnity, not exceeding
the amount of coverage."

Respondents argued there was no "other indemnity"
within the terms of appellant's bond (R-23, 27) saying
"other indemnity" applies only to other indemnity covering the same risks covered by appellant's policy, that
respondent First American's title policy does not eover
the same risk as appellant's bond. and that since plaintiff
claims only against appellant, appellant is liable.
That paintiff does claim against First American has
been shown in Point I. Because of that fact, the Summary
Judgment should be reversed on this ground alone.
To so hold that the title policy is not "other indemnity" within appellant's bond is to judicially reform the
clear language and meaning of the bond, so that it reads:

"If the Insured hold other valid or collectible
fidelity indemnity against any lo.ss, covered hereunder, the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder
only for such amount of such loss as is excess of
the amount of such other fidelity indemnity .... "
As previously shown, appellant's blanket bond covers
many risks besides fidelity, such as property damage
through crimes, indemnity for injured or killed employees, lost instruments, loss of property through rob.bery or other crimes, fraud by any person, guaranteeing
signatures, etc., so it is highly illogical to read th<'
limitation ·clause to say "other fidelity indemnity."
The obvious purpose of appellant's loss limitation
clause is to preclude an insured from recovering mon~
than his actual loss if his loss happens to be covered by
more than one policy, in consonance with the long-standing rule of insurance law and public policy limiting any
insured 's recovery through insurance to his actual loss.
Without such a clause, plaintiff might here recover tht>
amount of the First Federal mortgage from both def endants.
'There simply is no logical reason why a blanket
policy insurance underwriter, insuring against many varied contingencies, may not, in determining the policy
premium; reco·gnize the fact that the insured may
often obtain other coverage and thus provide in thP

blanket po.lie.\' that it is C'XCPss to the other coverage.
'l'li<'re is no lop;ical 1·eason v,·hy thP other insurancP, what''VC'l' its rov<·rng«', should not be lookc·d to.
f'nrtlH'r, it is fallflcious to sa:.- that therC' are differ1·nt risks i1wolvPd in the l\rn polic!Ps of d<'fC'nrlants. Tlw
ri:;;k of whirh plaintiff complains is tlw loss of priorit_\·

of its 1110rtgag<'. That is thf' actea1 loss or damagP ]llaintiff rdk•gc_'s, hut has not proven, it s·t~i'L::i.inPd. RPspondPnt
First A mPrican insured ag-ainst
"nny loss or dmnag(' . . . snstain(Pd) by rrason

of ... the prio1<ty over thP rnortgagP at tlw <lat<>
hPn•of of any liPn or <'nrmnbranrP not shown or
rcfrr;·('(l to in 8ehedul<' B or <>xclndt-d from coveragP in tlw conditions and stipulations.'' (R-23).
Appc•llnnl, muong oOwr thiu:~·s, insnn·cl aga:nst "any loss
hy i·<·n~~on of any d sl1om st, frnndnlp11t or eriminal uct of
0

an.\· (•111plo~·l'<', . . . including loss o.f property." The
"any loss" allrgedly sustained under both policirs was
thP failtm· to ohta:n rPlE·nlw of tlw First F'<>clPrnl mortgage~. 'l'lt<•:;<' imrnr~ng c1aus<>s ])oth 1·over tlw samP loss
and tlw sanw risk, that is, tlw ri:o;k of bss of ]Jlaintiff's
priority OV('t' the· First F('dPrnl rnortgagt'.
rl'lint tlw poL('ies rt>V<'l' the s:rnw risk is more ch•arly
shO\rn hv eonsidering that the titlP pol;cy insures "against
loss or d::unagP sustain (eel) hy reason of any defect in
llit· (·'~<·(·ntion of the rnortgagP (insurPJ) ", whPrPas appel-
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lant's policy also insures against "any loss ... by reason
of the forgery or alteration of ... any instrument. ... ''
Suppose Mr. Parker had forged Mrs. Parker's signature
on plaintiff's trust deed. Clearly both policies would
apply, as would the loss limitation clause of appellant's
policy providing for payment of "only for such amount of
such loss as is excess of the amount of such other indemnity."
There simply is no logical reason to apply the "samP
risk" exception here. The lack of logic is amplified by
noting that if respondent's title policy is looked to first
and it is determined that respondent First American is
liable upon its policy, then the claimed "same risk" exception to appellant's loss limitation clam:e never comes into
consideration. Respondents cannot herP say no. claim
has been asserted against respondent First American
and that First American's title policy should not b<>
looked at first, because the evidence shows plaintiff did
by letter of April 14, 1965, make formal demand upon
Security Title Company, agent for respondent First
American (R-77), and Security Title's counsel, no·w counsel for plaintiff, responded on June 17, 1965 ( R-78)
saying:
"However, we would have no choict' now but
to recommend to our client (Security Title) that
it deny the liability asserted heretofore hy Prudential in regard to the Parker loan. Thus, we do
no·t believe that there is any other insurance or
indt>mnity covering the loss sustained hy Pruden-

tial, so as to afford your St. Paul Company an
excuse for failing to discharge their obligation
to Prudential." (R-78, 79).
Tht> evidence shows Security Title has been paying the
First Ff>deral rnortgag<> (R-73, 74). In light of that
evidence, tht> title policy should be looked to first, and if
liability is found thereon, appellant's policy never C'omes
into C'onsideration at all.
Research has failed to disclose any case applying
the "same risk" exception to the perfectly logical "other
insuranC'e'' loss limitation clause of the either bankers
blankf't bonds or fidelity bonds, or involving an overlapping of such bonds with title policies.
The closl'st C'ase in point found is Hartford Steam
Rnila Inspection & Jnsurancr, Co. v. Cochran Oil llf ill &
Oinnery Co. (Ga. 1!)21) 105 S.1~. 85G, involving a boiler
policy and an Pmployer's liability policy, each providing
it was excess to other insurance. Plaintiff sued only on
the boiler policy hut was rf'pn s(mted by counsrl for tlw
employer's liability insurPr. The boiler policy insurt'd
plaintiff, first, for property loss hy explosion of plaintiff's boiler, and second, against liability for personal
injuries from boiler explosion. The employer's liability
polie~' insured against liability for injury to employees
from whakver cause. An employee was injured through
a boiler explosion. The court held there was no liability
11ndn tlte boikr policy b(•cause the employer's liability
1
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polircy was specific as to injured Pmployeps and that the
hoiler policy was general as to pPrso.ns, <'rnploy0Ps or
not, hurt in hoil0r Pxplosions. ConsPquentl,\-, thP Prnployer's liability policy "-as regarded as the primary
insurance, and since the loss was not in excess of the
amount of the emplo,\-er's liahility polic,\r, no liability
accrued under the ho.j]er policy.
The Court then' recognized tlw rule rE>spondents rel>upon, saying:
"The proposition is simple (~nough, when~
there are several valid policiPs in different companies, which insure the same party, upon tlH'
same suhject-matter, and assume the same risk.
This constitut0s \Ylrnt is denominated 'double insurance,' and under a statute of this state( cited),
and according to the rules established h,\r all of
the courts, each policy must in such a case contribute proportionately to the loss, even in absPnc<>
of any specific provision so n•quiring. Firemrm's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Pekar, 106 Ga. 1, 31 SE 779(:2).
Where, however, thE> insurance is not strictly and
technicallv 'double' insurance - that is, 1Dhere
the polici~s are not limited to the smne su!Jject
matter, a·nd the risk assumed is not identiwl or
coP:rte11sirP, lmt one policy is a 'ge11erul,' 'compound' or 'blanket' policy r111d the o th Pr is 'specific' and the rnles of priority are not specifically
p~ovided for by the policie' themselves - _tht>re
arises a great diversity and laek of harmony m tlw
various rules laid do-wn by tlH' ap1wllate courts of
different jurisdictions.

"In a case such as is now before us (that is,

1chere the several policies are of a different nature
and character, and where the risk assumed is only
partially coextensive, and where each policy ex-

pressly provides that the risk assumed, at the
point of mutual contact, is 'ex·cess' insurance only,
and thE>refore secondary to the other policy) the
deeisive test to be appliedin determining which of
these two limitations is to be given effect (that is,
which is really primary or basic insurance, and
which is excess insurance only) lies in the answer
to the question as to which insurance is general
and which is specific in nature." (Parenthesis
theirs).

The Court noted the boiler policy was more general
as to the protection afforded because it covered primarily
property loss and secondarily personal injury, and because it covered any persons injured, while the employer's policy prntected only injured employees. It no.ted
plaintiff's urging that the boiler policy was more specific because it was confined to injuries from one particular and stated cause, boiler explosions. The Court
said:
"The reason for the difficulty which seems to
arise when we undertake to definitely po.int to one
of these policies as specific and the other as general lies in the difference in the nature and character of the contracts. . . . In the instant case,

although the policies are in part coextensive as to
risk, they are nevertheless of very different type
and character . . . . The nature of the risks and
duties assumed, as well as the subject matter of
thr insuratice. is widely diverse. The only point
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of contact, the only contingency under which ho.th

~o~ic~es become applicable, is where an employee

is in1ured on account of a boiler or pipe explosion
(emphasis theirs). For the purpose of comparison it would seem to be proper, therefore, to disregard the various elements and provisions of the
two contracts, except as they bear or relate to the
happening of the one contingency wnder which
each policy might be held primarily or secondarily
liable (emphasis theirs).
* * *
"Upon an employee being injured by such an
explosion, the (boiler policy) is liable first and
primarily for the inevitably resulting property
loss, and, should there then be a surplus of insurance left over, it is liable for injuries occasioned
ho.th to employees and to others not employees.
Upon the happening of such a contingency the liability of (the employer's policy), on the other
hand, is limited solely to personal injuries to employees. Thus, in any case where both of the
p-0licies could possibly take effect, the liability
of the (b-Oiler policy) is general, while that of the
(other) is limited and specific. (Parenthesis
added, except as indicated.)
In the case at bar, the contingency which brings both
policies into play is an employee's dishonest failure to
obtain release of a prior mortgage. The Georgia case
expressly recognizes situations where the pohcies are
"widely diverse" "in type and character" and "in nature
of risks and duties assumed" as in the case at bar. It
held the boiler policy and employer's liability policy "are
in part co-extensive as to risk" though "the nature of
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the risks and duties assumed, as well as the subjectmatter of the insurance, is widely diverse." The Court
did not preclude a boiler insurer from looking to an
employer's liability policy for "other insurance" in a
boiler explosion case and appellant as a savings and
loan blanket insurer cannot here be precluded from
looking to a title insurPr for other indemnity when the
policies "are in part co-extensive as to risk," that is, the
risk of a "dishonest act of an employee" impairing "the
priority" of plaintiff's trust deed.
Here, regardless of which policy is specific and which
g·eneral, only appellant's policy contains the "excess insurance" clause. As between an "excess" policy and a
"no loss" policy, as is the title policy, the great majority
of courts hold the "no loss'' insurer liable, saying the
"e~:cess" policy is not availahlf> until the "other insurane<>" is exhausted. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Sec. 491-±; 29A Am Jur, Insurance, Sec. 1716; 46
A'LiR 2d 1165.
ln the Georgia case, the Court refused to look solely
to physical factors of how the loss occurred; that is, a
boiler explosion, but instead looked to the loss itself in
determining whether the policies covered the same risks
and wen• co-extensive. So here, the physical factor of
PH1ployee's fidelity as a cause of loss cannot be solely
looked to. The loss itself is here covered by both policies
and so thc> risks covc>red are co-extensive and the same.
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The Georgia case is a leading case cited by many
authorities. See, for example, 8 Appleman, Insurance
Law, p. 378, and 45 CJS, Insurance, Sec. 925, p. 1039.
Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, Sec. 1848, dealing with "proportionate recoveries and contributions,"
begins the section with the note: "The various rules
are discussed at some length in Hartford S.B.I. Co.
v. Cochran, 105 SE 856." It has been cited with approval numerous times, including in Employers Liability
A. Corp. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., (Cal. 1951) 227
P.2d 56; Commercial Gas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. &
Ind. Co., (Minn. 1934) 252 N.W. 435; and Continental
Gas. Co. v. S1dtenfield, (IC.A. 5th, 1956) 236 F.2d 438, fo.r
the proposition that where the policies are partially coextensive, both policies may still be looked to.
In M,iller v. Home Ins. Co. (Pa. 1933) 164 A. 819
where one policy indemnified against loss by tornado,
and another policy against loss by fire and tornado, the
Court said:
"'The lower court, reasoning by analogy from
those (prior) cases, concluded that, if there was
not identity of subject where one item in a policy
covering a building alone and an item in another
policy covered building and contents, there would
not be identity of risk where one policy covered
fire and another covered fire and tornado. Precisely at this point WP beli\:'VP the lower court fell
into error in no.t giving proper consideration to
the contract of insurance. We are all of the op in-
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ion that there was double insurance as the term
is here used, and the two im;urers were bound bv
thf' sarrw risk."
·
Here again, the Court refused to look to the physical
factors of the cause of loss, that is, tornado v. tornado
and fire, but looked to the object of the policiPs, or what
was insured, to decide if there is "identity of risk." In
tlw case at bar the object of appellant's fidelity coverage
is ''any loss, including loss of property,'' and this fidelity
coverage is secondary and incidental to the other coverages of property loss through crime, loss of customer's
property, loss of property through fraud by any persons,
any loss through guaranteeing signatures, counterfeit
money, forgPry of insurance and other clauses of appellant's IH>licy. '11 he object of respondent First American's
volicy is specifically and solely the title to the real property and insured "against any loss or damage . . . by
reason of ... the priority over the mortgage of any other
lien." 'l'hus, the object of the title policy here is the
iuorr specific and the objects of the two policies, that is
the failure to obtain release of the First Federal mortgage, are both tht> same.
Ht>8pondent 's argwnent fails as a matter of logic
and in light of the authorities cited.
'J'he only authorities \\·hich plaintiff cited in its rnemorarnlum to t1w trial court for its contention that there
i,; ''tltlwr insurance'' onl~y where the insun'd insures the
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same thing twice against the same perils were 29A Arn
Jur p. 153 and Couch, Encyclopedia of Law Insurance,
p. 3635. These authorities are taken from chapters pertaining to "Particular Concealments, Representations,
Warranties and Conditions." The "same risk" rule relief
upon arises from cases \d1ere the insurance policies
contain warranties by insured that they will no.t obtain
other rnsurance and provide they will be void if
other insurance is obtained (29A Am .Tur p. 149).
In those instances, there is reason to strictly construe
"other insuranc.e'' so as to avoid a forfeiture. Such is
not the case here, for the "other indemnity" clause of
appellant's policy does not seek to avoid liability but to.
indemn·i.fy plaintiff so that the insured recovers from
both policies only the actual amount of his loss and no
more.
For these reasons, the Court erred in ruling that
respondent's title policy is not "other indemnity" within
appellant's bond and in not ruling that appellant's liability is limited to the excess of other valid or collectible
indemnity over and above the title policy. The summary judgment should he reversed and the case remanded
for determination of respondent titlt> insurer's liability,
with instruction that respondent First American's policy
is "other indemnity" within appellant's hond.
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POIN T V.
1

MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT DO EXIST, AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Plaintiff's Affidavit was served upon appellant on
Thnrsday, July 1-1-, 1966 at 3 :15 p.m. (R-36), two working days before hearing of plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Monday, July 18, 1966. At hearing,
appellant objected to the timeliness of the affidavit and
appellant specifically advised the court that additional
facts needed to be presented to the Court before the
Motion should be heard (R-93, 100).
Rule 6(d), U.R.C.P., provides: "\iVhen a motion is
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with
the motion."
Rules 56(c) and (e), U.R.C.P.,provide:
"rI'ht> motion shall be served at least ten days
before the time fixed for hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve op}Jos ing affidavits ....
''Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
rnadt> on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to h'stify to th0 matters stah'd therein."
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The "shall" in Rule 6( d) makes it mandatory that
affidavits be served with motions and Rule 56(c) means
affidavits must be servPd 10 days before hearing of motions for summary judgment. Without this rule, thr
opponent simply has no time to obtain rebuttal affidavits
or to present additional facts.

In Canrning v. Star Publishing Company, 19 FRD
281, the opponent to summary judgment moved to strike
the movant's affidavit filed the day of hearing of the
motion. The Court said :

"Under F.R. 56(b), defendant has the election of filing supporting affidavits with his motion. I observe Federal Rule 6( d) applicable to.
all motions. 'When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion.' This leaves no room for judicial discretion.
Plaintiff's motion to strike is granted."
See also Sardo
20, saying:

i:.

McGrath, ('C.A.D.C., 1952) 19G F.2d

"Without such notice that allegations of fact
are being made for the record, there is no real
opportunity to enter the responses necessary to
create the genuine issue of material fact which can
stave off summary judgmPnt.''
Further, plaintiff's affidavit (H-:3:3) fails to show
that it is made on personal knmdPdge or to show affirma-
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tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the mattern stated, contravening Rule 56(e).
For these reasons, the affidavit of plaintiff should
not have been corn;iderPd by the court in ruling upon
the motions for summary judgment. This leaves the
complaint and answers as the only documents properly
before the Court in ruling on the motions. Therefore,
tlw following findings are not supported by the admissions contairn~d in the complaint and answers.
(a) Finding No. 3. Appellant's ans\ver admits its
hond provides for the indemnification set forth therein,
hut dmies plaintiff's allt>gation of what the bond provid0s. r_l'he bond, however, was not admitted into evidence
until October 18, 1966, when appellant's Motion to Amend
\ms heard (R. 81 ). ·without the bond in Pvidence, and
with an issue of fact existing as to its provisions being
raised hy tlw pleadings, the Court could not have determirn-•d as a rnattPr of fact what it provided and could
not have derided appellant's liability thereon as a matter
of lmv. This is critical to appellant, for without the bond
before it, thP Court could not have determined which
policy was general and which specific or whether or not
the policies covered the same risks.
(b) Finding No. (i.

The Court found "Plaintiff

has suffered a loss as a result of said dishonest ... act
of the employee, Rowley." Appellant's answer denies
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that plaintiff has suffered a loss. There was no evidence
before the District Court even in plaintiff's affidavit to
show whether or not tbe First Federal mortgage had been
paid at the time of hearing, and appellant's affidavit
(R-73, 74) affirmativley shows that Securitv Title has
been malting all of the payments on the First Federal
mortgage, inferring that Security Title or the title insurer has agreed to pay the entire mortgage. Further,
if respondent First American is liable and collectible
upon the title policy, then plaintiff has in fact suffered no
loss. The District Court refused to find whether respondent First American is so liable and collectible. For these
reasons the finding that plaintiff has suffered a loss is
in error, or at least there is a material issue of fact as
to whether plaintiff has sustained a loss, and the summary judgment should be reversed.
( c) Finding No. 10. The finding that "plaintiff
made no reliance on said policy prior to closing tht>
loan'' is in no way supported by the evidence and is a
genuine issue of fact. Appellant's answer denied that
allegation of the ,Complaint (R-6).
Rowley's misapplication of the proceeds of plaintiff's loan was discovered in March, 1965 ( R.-36). Hence,
plaintiff did in fact rely upon the title policy, for when
it was received in August, 19G3, it reflected plaintiff'~
lien as a first lien. Had it shown the true fact, that
plaintiff's lien was secondary, the defalcation would haw
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been discovered and Rowley could have then paid the
rull amount of the defaultation. Since the title policy
erroneously showed plaintiff's lien as prior, the policy
was placed in the loan folder, examined by subsequent
auditors and the loss was not discowred until March of
1965, at which time Rowley could not respond. Therefore, plaintiff did rely on the title policy as issued,
to its damage (R-101).
Moreover, the preliminary titlP rPport of Decemb€r
H), 19():2 quoted a premium for a $16,300 "A'TA" (rnortgaget''s) titl1> policy (R-:37), and reflected the First
Federal mortgage as an exception. Security Title knew
11lainti ff anti{'i imted having a valid first mortgage on
thP Parker property and that Parker's purchase contrart with TiowlPy was bPing refinanced (R-97). Security
Urns kiww that plaintiff anticipated receiving a titk
policy showing its trust deed as a first lien which would
iwecssarily mean plaintiff anticipated receiving a policy
which insurrd thr validity of the anticipated release of
tlw First Federal mortgage. Part of the policy premium
was to insure the existPncr and validity of that release.
First Auwrican bound itself to pay plaintiff its loss
if plaintiff's trust deed was not a first lien and if the
Virst FPderal rnortgagP had not rwen validly released.

rt

hasn't hPen rPleased, and it do('S not no,w lie in respon-

d(•ut 's mouths to say there was no n•liance upon the titk
l )() l i<>>'.
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Suppose Rowley had properly paid First Federal
but First Federal failed to release its mortgage and
the title company mistakenly insured plaintiff's trust
deed as a first lien. Then the title insurer could not
say plaintiff didn't rely on the policy, for one o.f the
things plaintiff bought 'vhen it bought the policy was
msurance that the First 1'\ deral mortgage had been
released.
1

The title policy (R-26) contains an exC'lusion in paragraph 3(d) (2) for "liens ... known to the Insured Claimant at the date such Insured Claimant acquired an estate
or interest insured by the policy, and not known to tlw
Complaint or not slwwn by the puhlic records." Tlw
First Federal mortgage was shown by public records and
was known to the title company for it was shown in the
preliminary report (R-38). A title insurer's liability
depends upon the contract and not upon notice to thP
owner or his lmo,,-ledge of the instruments of record:
Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, ~5209; Holly Hotel

Co. v. Title Guarantee Tritst Co., (N.Y. 1933) 264 N.Y.S.
3, 147 Misc. 861.
"\Vhere at the time a title policy was dcliYered, th<> title was defective 11y rPason of a lirn,
the contract was brearlwd and the company wa~
immediately liable> to the insnrPcl for the loss actually suff.erecl." A pplernan, 1nsuraneP Law &
Practice, ~5210.
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Respondents argue that Rowley's defalcation and
tht> loss occmed in December, 1962, whereas the title
policy was not issued until August, 1963, and therefore
plain ti ff made no reliance on the title policy at the time
of th<' defalcation. However, this disregards not only
the foregoing authorities but also rPspondents' allegation that plaintiff did not discover the loss under
March, 19G5, long after the title policy was delivered
(R-:15). Appellants bond (R-104) in the first parag-raph provides coverage against losses which "shall
happen at any time but which are discovered by the insur<:'d subs0quent to noon of the date hereof." Hence,
the measnring time for detenning whether or not there
i:,; any "othPr valid or collectible indemnity against any
loss, coverPd hPreunder" it at time of discovery of the
loss or at time of presentation o.f the proof of loss to
appellant. rrhat this is so is clearly shown by considering
tha.t if rPspondents' argument were correct, then even
if Rowh·:-' paid off the First Federal mortgage before

ih<' loss was discovered, plaintiff could still claim indemnity from defendants.
1<-,or thesP reasons, Finding No. 10 is to "reliance''
is not supported by the evidence, and is erroneous.
POTNT YI.
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT

DO EXIST AS TO

WHETHER THE TITLE INSURER IS LIABLE.
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Respondent First American asserts as a defense
(R-23) the exclusions from coverage of liens "created,
suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claiming
loss or damage," and says the acts and knowledge of
Rowley, plaintiff's loan o.fficer, are imputable to plaintiff so that the First Federal lien is one created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by plaintiff. This presents
the agency question, raised by the pleadings, of whether
Rowley's acts are imputa:ble to plaintiff. This is a mixed
question of fact and law upon which there is no evidence
before the Court which could determine this fact issue
as a matter of law. This issue involves such questions
as whether Rowley was acting within the scope of his
employment in committing the tort and whether the
facts justify imputing to plaintiff Rowl<'y's knowledge
that the prior First Federal lien had not been released.
Appellant urges that the facts herf' will bring into
application the rule that where an agent is acting personally and adversely to his principal in committing an
independent fraudulent act for his own aiccount and the
knowledge which is to be imputed to the principal is so
involved in his act that it is to the agent's interest to
conceal it from the principal, there is raisf'd a clear
presumption that the agent will not indicate the fach'
to the principal and therefore his knowledge is held not
to be imputed to the principal to bind him to the third
person. 3 Am J ur 2d p. 6-t.:t.
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Further, appellant relies upon the factual theo.ry,
as contained in appellant's offer of proof, that Security
'l'itlt> Company knew plaintiff took only first mortgages
(R-96), knew Rowley owned the Parker property and
was refinancing the Parker contract to pay himself off
at the time the preliminary title report was issued, as
stipulated to by plaintiff (R-97), and therefore Security
'l'itle, rrspo.ndent's agent, knew that Ro,vley was also
acting for the hmefit of himself, and knew that he had
exceeded his authority in not paying off the First Federal
mortgage when the title policy was issued. The knowledge
of tlw double agency and the knowledge that the first
mortgage hadn't been released (which the title company,
hy its contract, is bound to know) had to make the transaction suspicions on its face to the title insurer when it
i:-:s1wd the policy.
Section Hl5 of the Restatement of Agency, Second
)ll"OVi<le:-::

"A disclosed or partially disclosed principal
is subject to liability upon a contract purported
to lw made on his acrount hy an agent authorized
to Blake it for the principal's benefit, although the
agent acts for his own or other im~roper purposes, .unless th.e other party. h~s n,otzce t~t the
agent zs not actmg for the pnnczpal s benefd.
" ( c) Reason to bww improper motive.
\Ylwther or not the third 1wrson has reason to
knmv of the agent's impro1wr motive is a question
nf fact. If he knows that the agL'nt is acting for
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the benefit of himself or a third person, the trans~ction is suspicious on its face, and the principal
is not bound unless the agent is authorizt>d."
Sec. 166, Restatement of Agency Second provides:
"A person with notice of a limitation of an
agent's authority cannot subject the principal to
liability upon a transaction with the agent if he
should know that the agent is acting improperly.
" (a) If a person has information which would
lead a reasonable man to believe that the agent
is violating the orders of the principal, or that
the principal would not wish the agent to act
under the circumstances known to the agent, he
cannot subject the principal to liability. Any substantial depart1trc by an a.gent from the 11siwl
methods of conducting business is ordinarily a
sufficient warning of lack of authorizat1:on." (Emphasis added.)
The obvious irregularities, the delay between Dec.
1962 and August 1963, and the title company's lmowledgP
of Rowley's double agency precludes the title insurer
from imputing Rowley's knowledge and Rowley's acts
to plaintiff and therefore the First Federal mortgagr
was not a lien "created, suffered, assumed or agreed to"
by plaintiff.
In Hansen v. Western Title Insurance Co., (Cal.

1963) 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 98 ALR 2d 520, the court
construed this clause and held an encumhranc(~ "err-
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ated" by the insureds was not one which resulted from
mere inadvertence bnt that "created" meant a conscious
deliberate causation, particularly where the insurer had
an opportunity to know of the defect before it issued
the policy an<l where the insured was not guilty of intentionaU~r producing the claim against the property.

In First National Bank & Tntst Co. v. New York
Title l11s11ranre Co., (1939) 171 Misc. 854, 12 NYS 2d
703, the court held "assumed or agreed to" referred to
a particular defect or encumbrance assumed or agreed
to by tlw insured by the title conveyance to it or some
rollatPral agreement, made by the insured with reference
to the property; "created'' ref erred to some affirmative
art on tlw part of the insured; and "sufferPd," being
synonyrnous with "permit,'' implied thP power to prohibit
or prPvPnt and includf'd knnwlt>dge of what was to he
done with the intention that it be donP.
Unless Rowlf'y's knowledge and acts are imputable
lo plaintiff, thP exclusion in thP title policy cannot apply
to plaintiff.
In Baumann v. Puget Sowul Title Insurance Co.,
(Wash. 193;)) 49 P.2d 914, defPndant title company is~nC>d

a Ule

polic~'

insuring plaintiff against any encum-

hrnnee impairing the sPcurity of plaintiff's mortgag<>

giwn hY the mortgagor Aust. Aust represented the mortgag<> to plaintiff as a first mortgag<>. 'Ylwn the po.licy was
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delivered there was an outstanding first mortgage which
was not mentioned in the title policy. Plaintiff sued and
the title company claimed mutual mistake and prayed
for reformation of the policy so as to show the real first
mortgage as an exception, claiming it had issued a preliminary title report addressed to plaintiff under which
the real first mortgage was shown, and said that plantiff,
acting with kno·wledge of the contents of the preliminarr
report, was bound by its terms and that he consmmnatPd
the loan in reliance on the preliminary report and not
on the policy. The court expressly refused to rule on
the soundness of that contention, saying it was not supported by the facts because the preliminary report had
been delivered to Aust and never shown to plaintiff. The
court said:
"There was no mistakP or inequitable conduct on (plaintiff's) part. By fortuitious circumstance, the plaintiff insure·d his mortgage for what
it purported to be and for what he had b<c•en led
to believe it was - a first mortgage. Under these
facts, defendant cannot escape its obligation under
the policy on the ground of mutual mistake."
Likewise, in this case, if Rowley's knowledge of the
First Federal mortgage is not imputable to plaintiff
under the authorities heretfore cited, then First Anwrican insured plaintiff's mortgage for what plaintiff had
been led to believe it was - a first mortgage - and can·
not escape its obligation under the contract on tlw ground
of mutual mistake.
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Further, the title insurer here cannot claim mutual
mistake, for by its policy it bound itself not to make
such a rnistakl:'. If title policies could be avoided simply
he-canst> the insurer makes a mistake, they would bl' virtually worthless. There was no mutual mistake here;
tlw title company knew and was bound to know the First
Federal mortgage hadn't been released and plaintiff,
relying on the title policy, simply assumed it had been
relr•ased by the title polic~T's rcpresPntation that it had.
bePn.
For these reasons, there are material issues of fact
"xisting as to whethl'r respondent title insurer is liable
on its title policy. The summary judgment should therefore be reversed ana th!' cas!' remanded for trial.

POIKT YTL
THE DISTRICT ERRED IN DISMISSING RESPONDENT
FIRST AMERICAN "FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM".

The 8ummary JudgmPnt of .July 21, 1966 dismissed
rPsponclent First Aml'rican as a party defendant "as
no claim has bt>en stated against it upo.n which relil'f
ean be granted." (R-62)
That 8nmmarv Judgment is contrary to the Court's
mimttP entry (R-4-5) ·which denit•d def!'ndant First Am•·r;can 'f; motion, and is contrary to thP Court's ruling
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on hearing of the motion, and as previously indicated,
the Court several times refused to rule on First American's liability.
Plaintiff, and no one else, filed this actio.n for declaratory judgment, alleging the policies of both defendants
and the issues betwee-n them but joined only appellant as
a party and prayed the Court "make a declaratory
judgment ... stating whether or not said defendant (appellant) is excused from its liability by reason of the
existence of the said policy of title insurance." (R-4).
Thus, the issue o.f the liability of the respective defendants was tendered to the Court by plaintiff and declaratory relief was sought.
By 78-33-2, U.C.A. 1953 :
"Any person interested ... under a written
contract . . . may have determin1:1d any question
of construction or validity arising under tlw instrument ... in dt>claratory actions."

Section 78-33-11, U.C.A. 1953, provides as to declaratory judgments:
"\Vhen declaratorv relief is sought all persons shall be madf' parties who haw or claim any
interest which would he affected hy the dPclaration, and no declaration shall prejudiee the rights
of persons not rmrtiPS to the lll'Oeeeding. '' (I~lll
phasis added)

47
Here involved is not only the question of which
dPf Pndant insurer is liable to plaintiff, but also the
qtwstion of ultimate liability behYeen the insurers upon
subrogation to planitiff's rights, regardless of which defrndant pays plaintiff. Appellant moved to have the
titlP insurer joined as a defendant because plaintiff tendered to the Court the issue of which defendant is
liahle and the resulting declaration would affect tlw
d<>frndant title insurer. If defendant title insurer were
not joined, it would not he bound hy the declaratory
jrnlgrnent, neither for the purpose for determining its
liability to plaintiff and tlw resulting non-liability of
appellant, nor for the purpose of determining ultimate
liability as between the insurers. 'ro avoid piecemeal
litigation, tlw District Court, by Order of November 29,
19G5 (R-9) ordt>red First AmNican joined as a party
ddenclant. For the same reasons, the liability of both
<lf'f Pndants ought to be decided in this case by construing
both insnrnnce policies, rather than to dismiss defendant
First Anwrican for failure to state a claim against it.
By its pleading, plaintiff stated no claim against
the title insurPr, so appellant stated it for plaintiff in
its answer to the complaint for declaratory judgment.
Contrary to respondent's assertions, plaintiff does in
fact cbim against tlw title insurer, 'd1ich responded

to the elaim by paying on the First Federal mortgage.
'l'hp titlP insurer now seeks to pass its liability to plain-

tif'f' h~· having its counsel appear for plaintiff to claim
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against appellant. Such should not be permitted hv this
Court.
"vVhile a real controversy is a prerequisite

to a procee-ding for a declaratory judgment, plead-

ings should be interpreted with extreme liberality
and when the pleadings, being so interpreted, re-·'
veal by implication, dispute, the trial court is empowered to render declaratory judgment." 22 Arn
.Tur 2d p. 951.
"In view of the purpose of the statute to settle
controversies before they reach the stage wht>re
ordinary legal relief is immediately available, it
is clear that the complaint need not state ·what
would be a cause of action apart from thL' statute. " 22 Arn J ur 2d p. 952.
"Although the Uniform Act and other declaratory acts do not provide for counterclaims or
cross petitions, a defendant may set up his side
of the controversy as a counterclaim or in a cros~
complaint." 22 Am .J nr 2d p. 954.
See Gray v. De.fa, 103 Vt. 339, 135 P.2d 251, permitting counterclaims in declaratory judgment actions,
where this Court said:
"The adjudication of all issues rai8ed by the
counter claims 'vas necessary to a complete settlement of the rights of the parties arising out of
said contractual relationships. rrhe judgment rntered did not take into acconnt part of tlw issue~
raised by the counte1,elairn and therefore <.lid 11°1
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completely settle the controversy .... It would be
<'rror to refuse to take evidence on all issues raised
hy thPse eounterclaims."
Hence, appellant urges that the District Court's Order dismissing respondent First American for failure to
state a claim against it should be reversed and the case
remanded for determination of respondent First AmPrican 's liability.
In the alternative, and at the very least, First American should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
against it, but should be dismissed without prejudice.
If appellant is required to pay plaintiff's claim,
appellant would assert plaintiff's rights against First
AmPrican under appellant's right of subrogation, just
as First Ameriean would against appellant if First
A1t1Priean werP required to pa~' the claim.

Huh• -H(b), U.R.C.P., with regard to involuntary
dismissal, provides:
"L nless the eourt in its order for dismissal
othPrwisP specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dimissal not provided for in
this ruk•, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue o.r for laek of an
indespensihle party, operates as an adjudication
upon t h e men't s. "
ln lig·ht of Rul<> 4-1 (b), there is a qrn•stion as to
whPtlwr or not the dismissal of First American for faillll'P to state a claim against it is a dismissal on the merits.
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Plaintiff's claim against First American has not been
decided on the merits and therefore appellant urges that
this Court, at the very least, reverse the order dismissing
First American and direct that it be dismissed without
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Appellants urge that there are material issues of
fact remaining, that the pleadings before tht> Court an
insufficient to resolve the factual issues, that the District
Court erred as a matter of law in granting summar)'
judgment in favor of respondents upon grounds that the
title policy is not "other indemnity" within the meaning
of appellant's bond, and that the District Court erred
in dismissing respondent First American for failure to
state a claim against it, and respectfully submit that the
summary judgment should be rew•rsed and the case TP·
mantled to the District Court for determination of tlw
fa0tual issues, with instruction that respondent First
American's title policy is "other indemnity" within thP
meaning of applicant's bond, or at lPast, respondent First
American should be dismissed without prejudice.
Respectfull.Y submitted,
SKEEN, ~-ORSLEY, SNOW~
CHRISTENSEN
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